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Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) arguably represent the problem at the intersection of computer science
and economics with the deepest applications in real life. Within the realm of SSAs, the study of the effects
that showing one ad has on the other ads, a.k.a. externalities in conomics, is of utmost importance and has
so far attracted the attention of much research. However, evn the basic question of modeling the problem has
so far escaped a definitive answer. The popular cascade modelis arguably too idealized to really describe the
phenomenon yet it allows a good comprehension of the problem. Other models, instead, describe the setting more
adequately but are too complex to permit a satisfactory theoretical analysis. In this work, we attempt to get the
best of both approaches: firstly, we define a number of generalmathematical formulations for the problem in the
attempt to have a rich description of externalities in SSAs and, secondly, prove a host of results drawing a nearly
complete picture about the computational complexity of theproblem. We complement these approximability
results with some considerations about mechanism design inour context.
1 Introduction
The computation of solutions maximizing thesocial welfare, i.e., maximizing the total “happiness” of the ad-
vertisers, in sponsored search auctions (SSAs) strongly depends on how such happiness is defined. Clearly, the
more clicks their ads receive, the more content advertisersare. A naive measure to forecast clicks, named click
through rate (CTR), would only consider thequality of the ad itself (“better” ads receive more clicks). However,
one cannot overlook the importance ofexternalitiesin this context: specifically,slot-dependent externalities(i.e.,
ads positioned higher in the list have a higher chance to get aclick) andad-dependent externalities(e.g., the ad of
a strong competitor – e.g., BMW – shown in the first slot can only decrease the number of clicks that the ad – e.g.,
of Mercedes – in the second slot gets). Much research focusedon modeling externalities in SSAs and providing
algorithms for the resulting optimization problem.
On one hand of the scale, there is the simple, yet neat,cascademodel [9, 1]. In the cascade model, users
are assumed to scan the adssequentiallyfrom top to bottom and the probability with which a user clicks on the
ad ai shown in slotsm is the product of the intrinsic qualityqi of the ad, the relevanceλm of slot sm (slot-
dependant externality) and ofall the ads allocated to slotss1 throughsm−1. A host of results is proved in this
model as the input parameters vary (e.g.,λm ∈ {0, 1} rather thanλm ∈ [0, 1]). In its more general version,
the optimization problem of social welfare maximization isconjectured to be NP-hard, shown to be in APX (i.e.,
a 1/4-approximation algorithm is given) and shown to admit a QPTAS (a quasi-polynomial time approximation
scheme) [9]. In addition to its unknown computational complexity, the cascade model has two main limitations to
be considered a satisfactory model of externalities in SSAs. Fir t, it assumes that users have unlimited “memory”
and that, consequently, an ad in slots1 exerts externalities to an ad many slots below. This is experimentally
disproved in [7] wherein it is observed how thedistancebetween ads is important. Second, it assumes that the
externality of an ad is the same no matter what ad is exerted on. Nevertheless, while BMW can have a strong
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Table 1: Summary of our results: LB (UB, resp.) stands for lower (upper, resp.) bound on the approximation
of the problem; the row SP, instead, contains the approximation guarantees we obtain with truthful mechanisms.
Results marked by ‘⋆’ requirec = O(1). APX-completeness of a subclass of FNEaa(c)-nr is also given. (See the
model for details on the notation.)
externality on Mercedes since both makers attract the high end of market, the externality on makers in a different
price bracket, e.g., KIA, is arguably much less strong.
On the other hand of the scale, we can find models that try to address these limitations. In [6] Fotakiset
al. propose a model whereby users have limited memory, i.e., externalities occur only within awindowof c
consecutive slots, and consider the possibility that externalities boost CTRs (positiveexternalities) as well as
reduce CTRs (negativeexternalities). In particular, the externalities of an ad apply to ads displayedc slots below
(forward externalities) and ads displayedc slots above (backwardexternalities). Moreover, in order to model the
fact that externalities might have ad-dependent effect, they introduce the concept ofcontextual graph, whereby
vertices represent ads and edge weights represent the externality between the endpoints. Their model turned out
to be too rich to allow tight and significant algorithmic result (their main complexity results apply to the arguably
less interesting case of forward positive externalities).
1.1 Our contribution
The present work can be placed in the middle of this imaginaryspectrum of models for externalities in SSAs. Our
main aim is to enrich the literature by means of more general ways to model slot- and ad-dependent externalities,
while giving a (nearly) complete picture of the computational complexity of the problem. We do not attempt to
explicitly model the user’s behavior but bridge the aforementioned models in order to overcome the respective
weaknesses. In detail, we enrich the naive model of SSAs by adding the concepts of window and contextual
externalities, while keeping ad- and slot-dependent externalities factorized as in the cascade model. We also
complement much of the known literature by studying a model wherein the externalities coming from ads and
slots cannot be expressed as a product. Our study gives rise to a number of novel and rich models for which we can
provide (often tight) approximability results (see Table 1for an overview).1 Since the case ofselfishadvertisers is
of particular relevance in this context, we also initiate thstudy of mechanism design for the optimization problems
introduced and consider theincentive-compatibilityof our algorithms, i.e., whether they can be augmented with
payment functions so to work also with selfish advertisers.
For the version in which slot- and ad-dependant externalities cannot be factorized and externalities occur in a
window of sizec, we prove that the optimization problem is inP , if c is a constant. We consider the LP relaxation
of the ILP describing the problem and prove that the integrality gap is 1.
For the variant of the problem with factorized externalities, contextual ad-dependent externalities and window
of c slots, a distinction on the effects that empty slots have on users’ behavior is useful. In a sort of whole page
optimization fashion [10], we think of those slots as occupied by aspecial(fictitious) ad used to refresh (e.g., by
means of pictures) the user’s attention.
If the special ad cannot be used (or, equivalently, the user’s attention cannot be reset) we prove that the
allocation problem is poly-APX-complete whenever users have “large” memory (i.e., the window equals the
number of slotsK). Specifically, we give an approximation preserving reduction from the Longest Path problem
and design an approximation algorithm using several different ideas and sources of approximation; interestingly,
its approximation guarantee matches the best known approximation guarantee for Longest Path. However, we
prove that this algorithm cannot be used in any truthful mechanism and note that a simple single-item second
price auction gives a weaker, yet close, truthful approximation. We complement the results for this model with the
identification of tractable instances for which we provide an exact polynomial-time algorithm. Forc < K instead,
1It is important to notice that, as common in the literature onSSAs, the number of slots is a parameter of the problem (rather than fixed)
for otherwise the computational problem becomes easy (by, e.g., running the color coding algorithm).
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we are unable to determine the exact hardness of approximating the problem in general. To the APX-hardness
proof, we pair a number of approximation algorithms that assume constantc. The first, based on color coding
[2], returns a non-constant approximation on any instance of SSA. The second assumes that the contextual graph
is complete and returns a solution which (roughly) guarantees aγcmin fraction of the optimum social welfare,
γmin being the minimum edge weight in the graph. Interestingly, this algorithm shows the APX-completeness
of the subclass of instances having constantγmin (we indeed further provide a hardness result for instances with
complete contextual graphs). We believe the tight result for this subclass of instances to be quite relevant. In fact,
complete contextual graphs are quite likely to happen in real-lif : the results returned by a keyword search are
highly related to one another, and, as such, each pair of ads has a non-null externality, however small.
If the special ad can be used, the problem becomes easier and turns out to be APX-complete, for anyc. We
first prove the problem withc = K to be APX-hard, via a reduction from (a subclass of) ATSP (i.e., asymmetric
version of TSP) and then surprisingly connect instances with c < K to instances withc = K by reducing the case
with c = 1 to the case withc = K andbinaryexternalities (intuitively, the weights of the edges of thecontextual
graph can be either 0 or 1). We finally observe how a simple greedy algorithm cleverly uses the special ad to return
1/2-approximate solutions and leads to a truthful mechanism.
2 Model
In a SSA we haveN ads andK slots. We assume that each ad corresponds to an advertiser; th is w.l.o.g. from
the optimization point of view. We denote each ad byai with i ∈ N , whereN = {1, . . . , N} is the set of indices
of the ads. We introduce a fictitious ad, denoted bya⊥, s.t., when allocated, the slot is left empty. TheK slots are
denoted bysm with m ∈ K, K = {1, . . . ,K} being the set of slot indices s.t.s1 is the slot at the top of the page
andsK is at the bottom. We also have a fictitious slot, denoted bys⊥ s.t. an ad allocated tos⊥ is not displayed in
the webpage. Each adai is characterized by: (i) thequality qi ∈ [0, 1], i.e., the probability a user clicks on adi
when he observes it, irrespectively of other externalities; (ii ) the valuationvi ∈ R+ advertiseri associates to his
ad being clicked by a user. The fictitious ad⊥ hasq⊥ = v⊥ = 0.
A feasible allocation of ads to slots, denoted asθ, consists of an ordered sequence of adsθ = 〈a1, . . . , aK〉 s.t.
the ads are ordered by increasing slot number, i.e.,a1 is allocated to the top slot,aK to the bottom one. Every ad
ai can be allocated to at most one slot, whereasa⊥ can be allocated to more than one slot. The set of all possible
feasible allocations is denoted asΘ. With a slight abuse of notation, we let (i) θ(ai) denote the index of the slot ad
ai is allocated to, and (ii ) θ(sm) denote the index of the ad allocated tosm. Givenθ ∈ Θ, theclick through rateof
adai, denoted asCTRi(θ), is the probability adai is clicked by the user taking externalities into consideration.





A 1/α-approximate solutionθ satisfiesSW (θ) ≥ SW (θ∗)/α.
Typically, CTRi(θ) defines how the qualityqi of adai is “perturbed” by the externalities in terms of click
probability. Accordingly, in generalCTRi(θ) = qiΓi(θ), Γi(θ) being a function encoding the effect of externali-







l=1 λl, λm ∈ [0, 1], called thefactorized prominenceof sm, denotes the slot-dependant
externality andγi ∀i ∈ N , calledcontinuation probability, denotes the ad-dependent externality. (W.l.o.g., we
assumeΛ1 = λ1 = 1.) Our conceptual contribution rests upon novel and richer ways to defineΓi(θ), along three
main dimensions.
The first dimensionconcerns theuser memory, a.k.a. window. We let c be the number of ads displayed
aboveai in θ, from sθ(ai)−1 to sθ(ai)−c, that affectΓi(θ). Thesecond dimensionconcerns a generalization of
the externalities. Here we propose two alternative families of externalities, calledsa (for slot-ad) andaa (for
ad-ad). The sa-externalities remove the factorization in slot- and ad–dependent externalities: i.e.,λm andγi are
substituted by parametersγm,j ∈ [0, 1], m ∈ K andj ∈ N . When the window isc, the CTR is defined as
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This definition captures the situation in which an ad can affect the ads displayed below it in a different way
according to the position in which it is displayed. For the aa-externalities, on the other hand, we preserve the
factorization inλm andγi, but redefine these latter parameters asγi,j ∈ [0, 1] whereaj is the ad that is displayed
in the slot just belowθ(ai). It is convenient to see theγi,j ’s as the weights of thecontextual graphG = (N , E)
where the direct edges(i, j) weighγi,j > 0 and represent the way adi influencesaj . Note that non-edges ofG





whereΛm is defined as above. This definition captures the situation inwhich each ad can affect each other ad in
a different way.
The third dimensionconcerns the definition ofγm,⊥ for the sa-externalities andγi,⊥ andγ⊥,i for the aa-
externalities. In the modelwith resetwe haveγm,⊥ = 1 for sa andγi,⊥ = γ⊥,i = 1 ∀i ∈ N ∪ {⊥} for aa. This
variant captures the situation in which slots can be distribu ed in the page in different positions (a.k.a., slates) and,
in order to raise the user’s attention, we can allocate a content, e.g. pictures, that nullifies the externality between
the ad allocated before and after the content. In the modelwithout reset, γm,⊥ = 0 for sa andγi,⊥ = γ⊥,i = 0
∀i ∈ N ∪ {⊥} for aa, thus capturing the situation in which leaving a slot empty between two allocated slots does
not provide any advantage.
We let FNEx(c)-y be the problem of optimizing the social welfare in our model with Forward Negative
Externalities with windowc, x ∈ {sa, aa}-externalities and y∈ {r, nr} reset (r stands for reset; nr for no re-
set). When the value of y is not relevant for our results, we talk about FNEx(c). We are interested in two particular
subclasses of FNEaa(c), namely: (i) subclass FNE+aa(c)-y, defined upon a complete contextual graph and such
that0 < γmin = mini,j∈N ,i6=j γi,j and (ii ) subclassB–FNEaa(c)-y, whereγi,j can take values in{0, 1}.
2.1 Mechanism design
We use the theory of mechanism design to study the incentive-compatibility of our algorithms [12]. Amechanism
M is a pair(A,P ), whereA : (R+)N → Θ is an algorithm that associates to any vectorv = (v1, . . . , vN ) of
valuations a feasible outcome inΘ (only valuations are private knowledge). The payment functio Pi : (R+)N →
R
+ maps valuation vectors to monetary charges for advertiseri. The aim of each advertiser is to maximize his
own utility ui(v, vi) = CTRi(A(v))vi − Pi(v). An advertiser could misreport his true valuation and declar
v̂i 6= vi whenui((v̂i,v−i), vi) > ui(v, vi), v−i being the vector of the valuations of all the agents buti. We are
then interested in truthful mechanisms. A mechanism istruthful if for any i ∈ N , v−i ∈ (R+)N−1, vi, v̂i ∈ R+,
ui((v̂i,v−i), vi) ≤ ui(v, vi).
In this setting, a monotone algorithmustbe used in truthful mechanisms [3]. AlgorithmA is monotone if
for anyi ∈ N , v−i ∈ (R+)N−1, CTRi(A(v̂i,v−i)) is non-decreasing in̂vi. Important for our work is also the
family of VCG-like mechanisms, a.k.a.,Maximal In Range (MIR)mechanisms. An algorithmA is MIR if there
existsΘ′ ⊆ Θ s.t. A(v) ∈ arg maxθ∈Θ′ SW (θ) ∀v ∈ RN [11]. These algorithms can be augmented with a
VCG-like payment so to obtain truthful mechanisms. (VCGs are MIR mechanisms whereinΘ′ = Θ.) We are
interested in mechanisms for which bothA andP are computable in polynomial time. MIR mechanisms run in
polynomial-time if the MIR algorithm does. As usual in the context of SSA, we adopt a pay-per-click payment
scheme, i.e., we chargePi(v)/CTRi(A(v)) when a user clicks onai.
3 FNEsa(c) is in P for constant c
Our presentation focuses on FNEsa(1)-nr to simplify the notation. The more general cases whenc > 1 and the
reset model is considered are easily obtainable by generalization from FNEsa(1), but require a more cumbersome
notation without significant new ideas (see discussion at the end of this section). We first give the ILP formulation
of FNEsa(1)-nr and prove that if there is an optimal fractional solution, then there are at least two feasible integral
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solutions with the same value of social welfare. Since it is well known, by LP theory, that the ellipsoid algorithm
can be forced (in polynomial-time) to output an integral optimal solution, we are able to prove the following:
Theorem 1. For c = O(1), there is a polynomial-time optimal algorithm for FNEsa(c).



























xi,m+1,j ∀i ∈ N ,
2 ≤ m < K
∑
i∈N





xj,m,i = 1 ∀m ∈ K \ {1}
x1,i ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ N
xj,m,i ∈ {0, 1} ∀2 ≤ m ≤ K,
i, j ∈ N , i 6= j
wherexj,m,i = 1 iff ai is allocated to slotsm, m > 1, andaj is allocated to slotsm−1; x1,i = 1 iff ai is allocated
to s1. The objective function and the constraints are rather straightforward and, hence, their description is omitted
here.
The next proposition proves Theorem 1 since it shows that we can solve the above ILP in polynomial-time,
despite its similarities with the 3D-assignment, a well-know NP -hard problem.
Proposition 1. The continuous relaxation of the above ILP always admits integral optimal solutions.
Proof. We show that, if there is an optimal fractional solutionx, then there are at least two feasible integral solu-
tions with the same value of social welfare. Specifically, weprove thatx is equivalent to a probability distribution




















In order to show thatP(θ) is actually a probability distribution over allocations, we show that
∑
θ∈Θ P(θ) = 1.
The proof is recursive. LetΘ′ be the set of allocationsθ with the same firstK − 1 ads. The allocations inΘ′
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By applying recursively the same argument above fromΘ′′ ⊃ Θ′, the set of all allocationsθ satisfyingθ(sl) = al,










i∈N x1,i = 1. This shows thatP(θ) is a well defined
probability distribution. The proof concludes by observing that all integral solutions are indeed feasible.
To solve the problem whenc > 1, we just need to modify the ILP and allow each variablex to depend onc + 2
indices to take into account the (at most)c indices of all the ads that precede the ad of interest. The reset model
for c = 1 instead requires the introduction ofK additional variables fora⊥ to be visualized in each slot (together
with some constraints to fix each variable fora⊥ to a slot).
Theorem 1 implies that mechanism design becomes an easy problem for FNEsa(c) andc = O(1), since the
optimal algorithm can be used to obtain a truthful VCG mechanism.
4 FNEaa(K)-nr is Poly–APX–Complete
4.1 Easy Instances
As a warm-up, we identify a significant class of instances of FNEaa(K)-nr for which we can design a polynomial-
time optimal algorithm. These instances are characterizedby the fact that the underlying contextual graph is a
DAG, thus modeling nearly oligopolistic markets in which the ads can be organized hierarchically. The idea of
Algorithm 1 is that since DAGs can be sorted topologically inpolynomial time then we canrenamethe ads as
a1, . . . , aN so to guarantee that for any pair of adsai, aj , if i < j then(aj , ai) /∈ E . We can then prove that we
can focus w.l.o.g. onorderedallocationsθ, i.e., for any pair of allocated adsai, aj, with i < j, θ(ai) ≤ θ(aj).
Consider an unorderedθ and letai be the first ad (from the top) for which there existsaj , i < j, such that
θ(ai) > θ(aj). Sinceγj,i = 0 then all the adsak s.t. θ(ak) ≥ θ(ai) haveCTRk(θ) = 0 and, therefore, we
can pruneθ of (i.e., substitute witha⊥) ai and all the subsequent ads without any loss in the social welfare.
But then in the class of ordered allocations, the optimum hasan optimal substructure and we can use dynamic
programming. LetD[i,m] be the value of the optimal ordered allocation that uses onlyslotssm, . . . , sK and
allocates adai in sm. It is not hard to see thatD[i,m] = Λmqivi +maxj>i γi,jD[j,m+1] and that the optimum
is maxi∈[N ]D[i, 1]. In the pseudo-code of the algorithm, we simply construct the tableD after the topological
sort of the contextual graph (with renaming of the ads) is done. The algorithm runs in timeO(KN2).
Algorithm 1
1: TOPOLOGICALSORT(G)
2: for all m ≤ K do
3: D[N,m] = ΛmqNvN
4: for all i ≤ N do
5: D[i,K] = ΛKqivi
6: for i = N − 1 to 1 do
7: for m = K − 1 to 1 do
8: D[i,m] = Λmqivi +maxj>i γi,jD[j,m+ 1]
9: return (maxi∈[N ] D[i, 1])
Since social welfare maximization is a utilitarian problem, and given that the algorithm above is optimal we can
use the VCG mechanism to obtain a polynomial-time optimal truthful mechanism.
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4.2 Hardness
We now prove the hardness of approximating FNEaa(K)-nr.
Theorem 2. FNEaa(K)-nr is poly–APX–hard.
Proof. We reduce from the Longest Path problem. An instance of the Longest Path problem consists of a direct
graphG′ = (T,A) whereT is the set of vertices of the graph andA 6= ∅ is the set of unweighted edges. The
problem demands to compute alongest simple path, i.e., a maximum length path that visits each vertex of the
graph at most once. This problem is poly–APX–complete [5] and the best known asymptotic approximation is
log |T |/|T |. From an instanceG′ = (T,A) of Longest Path we obtain an instance of FNEaa(K)-nr as follows.
For each vertexti ∈ T we add an adai, with qi = vi = 1 and for each directed arc(ti, tj) ∈ A we add an arc
(i, j) in E . Furthermore, we setγi,j = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E andγi,j = 0 otherwise. Finally, we setN = K = |T | and
Λm = 1, ∀m ∈ [K].
Given an ordered sequence of verticesρ = (t1, t2, . . . , tN ), we denote aslen(ρ) the length of the path that
starts int1 and visits the nodes inρ till the first nodetj s.t. (tj , tj+1) 6∈ A is reached. Let us denote asρ∗
the sequence that describes the longest path inG′ and asθ∗ the allocation that maximizes the social welfare
in the instance of FNEaa(K)-nr defined uponG′. It is easy to check thatlen(ρ∗) = SW (θ∗) − 1. Indeed,
θ∗ allocates sequentially from the first slot the ads that correspond to the vertices composing the longest path.
Conversely, we can transform an allocationθ into a sequence of verticesρ just by substituting the ads with their
corresponding vertices until the firsta⊥ in θ is found. Thus, we have that forθ and the correspondingρ it holds
len(ρ) = SW (θ)− 1.
Consider a genericα-approximate allocationθα for FNEaa(K)-nr: SW (θα) ≥ αSW (θ∗). SinceA is non-
empty, there is a solutionθ2 to FNEaa(K)-nr of social welfare at least2. Let θβ denote the solution in{θα, θ2}
with maximum social welfare. Asθα is anα-approximate solution so isθβ . By letting ρβ denote the path
constructed fromθβ as described above, we prove that the reduction preserves the approximation (up to a constant
factor): len(ρβ) = SW (θβ)− 1 ≥ 12SW (θβ) ≥
α
2 SW (θ
∗) = α2 (len (ρ
∗) + 1) ≥ α2 len(ρ
∗).
4.3 Approximation algorithm
We show that the problem is in poly–APX, with an approximation ratio that is asymptotically the same as the best
guarantee known for Longest Path. Our algorithm combines thColor Coding (CC) algorithm [2] together with
three approximation steps.
Let C be a set containingK different colors. CC is a random algorithm, randomly assignin colors fromC
to the ads, and then finding the bestcolorful (i.e., no pair of ads has the same color) allocation. To find the best
colorful allocation, given a random coloring we do the following. ForS ⊆ C, we define(S, ai) as the set of partial
allocations with the properties of having the same number|S| of allocated ads (each colored with a different color
of S) in the first |S| slots and having adai in slot s|S|. We start fromS = ∅ where no ad is allocated. Then,
allocating one of the ads in the first position, we add one color t S until S = C. Iteratively, the algorithm extends
the allocations in(S, ai) appending a new ad, sayj , with a color not inS in slot s|S|+1 obtaining(S ∪ {oj}, aj)
whereoj is the color ofaj . Each partial allocation in(S, ai) is characterized by the values ofSW andΓi. We can
safely discard all the Pareto dominated partial allocations: given two allocationsθ1 andθ2 in (S, ai), we say that
θ2 is Pareto dominated byθ1 iff SW (θ1) ≥ SW (θ2) andΓi(θ1) ≥ Γi(θ2). However, there is no guarantee that
the number of allocations in(S, ai) is polynomially bounded and, in principle, all the generated O(NK) partial
allocations may be Pareto efficient. The complexity per coloring isO(2KNK+1K2). CC generateseK random
colorings, but it can be derandomized with a cost oflog2(N) and a total complexityO((2e)KK2NK+1(logN)2).
To make the algorithm polynomial, we apply three approximaton steps. Initially, we briefly sketch these three
approximations and, subsequently, we provide the details.Fir tly, we run CC over a reduced numberK ′ of slots
whereK ′ = min(⌈log(N)⌉,K). Secondly, we discard all the allocationsθ in which the probability to click on the
last allocated ad is smaller than a givenδ ∈ [0, 1]. Finally, we discretize theγi,j ’s. We prove in the following that
the running time is indeed polynomial and the approximationratio is(1 − δ)(1 − ǫ) log(N)2min{N,K} , ǫ controlling the
granularity of theγi,j discretization. All the three approximations are necessary in order to obtain a polynomial-
time algorithm. This algorithm is not monotone as we show below. However, a simple1/K-approximate truthful
mechanism can be obtained, via a single-item second price auction. From here on, we provide the details of the
algorithms and we prove its approximation ratio.
underlineApproximation 1. We apply CC over a reduced numberK ′ of slots, whereK ′ = min(⌈log(N)⌉,K),
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implying the following approximation ratio.
Proposition 2. Given θ∗, the optimal allocation overK slots, andθ∗K′ , the optimal allocation over the first






Proof. We partitionK ′′ = min{N,K} slots in groups ofK ′ consecutive slots. There could be remaining slots
that will constitute the last group with less thenK ′ slots. The number of groups in which theK slots are divided
is NG = ⌈K
′′
K′
⌉. LetGi = {(i − 1)K ′ + 1, . . . ,min(iK ′,K)}, for i ∈ [NG], be thei-th group of indices ofK ′
slots.
We letSW (θ|Gi) =
∑
m∈Gi















∗). The proof concludes by noting that, by optimality,SW (θ∗K′) ≥ SW (θ
∗|Gi).
Approximation 2. In CC, we discard allocationsθ in whichΓi(θ) of the last allocated adai, i ∈ [N ], is less than a
givenδ ∈ [0, 1], implying the following approximation ratio.
Proposition 3. Givenθ∗K′ , the optimal allocation overK
′ slots, andθδK′ the optimal allocation among the alloca-




≥ (1− δ)SW (θ∗K′).
Proof. Consider the allocationθ∗K′ and assume that the last ad satisfyingΓi(θ
∗
K′) ≥ δ is the one in slotsl.
Recalling the notationSW (θ|S) for S ⊆ [K], provided in the proof of Proposition 2, by optimality ofθ∗K′





SW (θ∗K′ |{l + 1, . . . ,K}). Indeed, on the r.h.s. we have a lower bound on
the social welfare that the ads allocated byθ∗K′ in slots sl+1, . . . , sK′ would have if shifted to the first slot.
If this were bigger thanSW (θ∗K′) then θ
∗
K′ would not be optimal. But then sinceΓθ∗K′(l+1) < δ, we have
δSW (θ∗K′) ≥ SW (θ
∗
K′ |{l+ 1, . . . ,K}).
Finally we have thatθδK′ , the allocation that removes fromθ
∗
K′ the ads allocated fromsl+1 to sK′ , has








K′) = (1− δ)SW (θ
∗
K′).
Approximation 3. In CC, we use rounded values forγi,j . More precisely, we use⌊ 1τ log
1
γi,j
⌋ in place oflog 1
γi,j
,
where the normalization constantτ is defined below. The constraint due to Proposition 3 is now a capa ity con-











⌋. Notice that, with rounded values, the capacity




⌋) and therefore we can now bound the number of allocations
to be stored in(S, ai). More precisely, for each value of capacity, we can discard all the allocations except one
maximizing the social welfare measured with rounded values. This step has the following consequences on the
approximation guarantee.
Proposition 4. GivenθδK′ , defined as in Proposition 3, andθ
δǫ
K′ , the optimal allocation when the rounding proce-
dure is applied, we have that, choosingτ = 1
K′















































































































This concludes the proof.
The approximation ratio of the algorithm is thus(1− δ)(1− ǫ) log(N)2min{N,K} , asymptotically the same as the best
known approximation ratio of the Longest Path onceN = K. The complexity instead can be derived as follows.








dominations. Thus, given thatlog( 11−ǫ) → ǫ asǫ → 0, the number of elements isO(K
′ 1
ǫ
). Thus, the complexity




)N2 log4(N)) = O( 1
ǫδ
N3 log4(N)).
Notice that all the three above approximations are necessary in order to obtain a polynomial–time algorithm.
Approximation 2 and Approximation 3 allow us to bound the number of the allocations stored per pair(S, ai) and
would lead, if applied without Approximation 1, to a complexity O((2e)KK2N2 log2(N) 1
ǫδ
). Notice also that,
without Approximation 2, the possible values for the capacity are not upper bounded. Approximation 1 allows us
to remove the exponential dependence onK and to obtain polynomial complexity.
Non–monotonicity of the approximation algorithm
In this section we prove that the algorithm is not monotone and therefore we cannot augment it with a payment
function to obtain a truthful mechanism.
Let us initially consider the case where Approximation 1 is not used, therefore all theK slots can be allocated.
We will discuss below how to extend the proof to the case whereApproximation 1 is used.
Consider the following instance of FNEsa(K)-nr:
• K = 3 slots;
• N = 4 ads, whereq1v1 = 22τ Λ2−Λ32
−6τ
Λ2−Λ3
+3, q2v2 = x, q3v3 = q4v4 = 1, whereτ is the generic rounding
factor of Approximation 3;
• the contextual graph is s.t.γi,j = 0 ∀i, j ∈ [N ] except: γ1,2 = 2(−4+φ)τ , γ1,3 = 2−τ , γ2,4 = 2−τ ,
γ3,2 = 2
−τ . φ is a small number;































• theK colours are{o1, o2, o3}.
The productq1v1 has been chosen s.t., whenx is in the neighbourhoodof22τ Λ2−Λ32
−4τ
Λ2−Λ3
, a1 is always allocated
in the first slot. Thus, we can focus only on the colouring thatassigns colouro1 to a1, o2 to a2 ando3 to a3 anda4.
Indeed, with this colouring the two longest path of the contextual graph are colourful, i.e. the unique two colourful
allocations areθ1 = (a1, a3, a2) in the set({o1, o2, o3}, a2) andθ2 = (a1, a2, a4) in the set({o1, o2, o3}, a4).
Notice that, with this colouring, all the allocations whereth re is a pair of ads(ai, aj) with γi,j = 0 are
infeasible, not satisfying the capacity bound. We will now prove that the approximation algorithm is not monotone
with respect toa2.
Let us denote bỹSW the social welfare computed on the basis of the rounded values. It is easy to check that
the following hold:S̃W (θ1) = 22τ Λ2−Λ32
−6τ
Λ2−Λ3
+ 3 + Λ22
−4τx + Λ32







−4τx. Notice that the roundedCTR2 in θ2 is always greater than the one inθ1, givenΛ2 ≥ Λ3,
whileCTR2(θ1) = Λ32−2τ > Λ22(−4+φ)τ = CTR2(θ2) whenΛ2Λ3 < 2
2τ−φτ .
We have that̃SW (θ1) > S̃W (θ2) whenx > 22τ Λ2−Λ32
−4τ
Λ2−Λ3
. Thusa2 gets a lower CTR by increasing her bid,
which proves that the algorithm is not monotone.
The example can be extended also to the case where Approximation 1 is applied introducing ads withqv = 0
andγi,j = 0, s.t. logN = K.
5 FNEaa(K)-r is APX-complete
In this section we will prove the APX-hardness of FNEaa(K)-r and provide a1/2-approximation algorithm.
5.1 Hardness
In this section we prove that FNEaa(K)-r is APX–hard.
Theorem 3. FNEaa(K)-r cannot be approximated within a factor of11+α , for α <
1
412 , unlessP = NP .
Proof. We reduce from the Asymmetric TSP with weights in{1, 2}, hereinafter denoted asATSP (1, 2). The
ATSP (1, 2) problem demands finding a minimum cost Hamiltonian tour in a complete directed weighted graph
G′ = (T,A) whereT is the set of nodes ofG′, A is the set of edges and the weight functionwi,j ∈ {1, 2}
for all edges(i, j) ∈ A. ATSP (1, 2) cannot be approximated in polynomial time within a factor of11+β , with
β < 1/206 [8]. Below, we denote asτ a solution of anATSP (1, 2) instance, ascost(τ) its cost and asτ∗ the
optimal tour.
Given an instance ofATSP (1, 2) on graphG′ = (T,A) we construct an instance of FNEaa(K)-r as follows:
(i) for each vertexti ∈ T we generate an adai with qi = vi = 1, then we haveN = |T |; (ii ) the contextual graph
is G = ([N ], E), where(i, j) ∈ E iff wi,j = 1; (iii ) for all (i, j) ∈ E , γi,j = 1; and finally (iv) the number of
slots is equal to the cost of the optimal tourτ∗ in ATSP (1, 2), i.e. K = cost(τ∗). We will show at the end of
the proof how we can deal with the fact that we do not knowc st(τ∗). Observe that withK = cost(τ∗), we have
SW (θ∗) = N , θ∗ denoting the optimal solution of the FNEaa(K)-r instance constructed. The definition of the
reduction is completed by observing that an allocationθ for the FNEaa(K)-r that allocates all theN ads can be
easily mapped back to a tourτ for theATSP (1, 2) by simply substituting the ad with the corresponding vertex
of the graphG′.
Let us suppose for the sake of contradiction that there exists a 11+α -approximate algorithm for FNEaa(K)-r,
with α < β2 <
1
412 . Let θα be the
1
1+α–approximate solution returned by such an algorithm, i.e.,SW (θα) ≥
1
1+αSW (θ
∗) = N1+α . It is easy to check thatθα consists of⌈
N
1+α⌉ ads, each providing a contribution of 1 to the
social welfare, while there areSW (θ∗)−⌈ N1+α⌉ ads that w.l.o.g. we can consider empty. Moreover, beingα < 1,
N
1+α ≥ cost(τ
∗)− N1+α holds. For the sake of conciseness, hereinafter we omit the ceiling notation. Letτβ be the
tour obtained fromθα. We state that inτβ there are, at least,2N1+α −cost(τ
∗)−1 edges of weight 1. Divide the ads
allocated inθα in two sets: the N1+α allocated adsai i ∈ [N ] anda⊥. Allocate in alternation one of the
N
1+α ads
ai, with i ∈ [N ], and one of thecost(τ∗)− N1+α adsa⊥. When the slot index2(cost(τ
∗)− N1+α ) is reached, the
availablea⊥ are finished, thus, in the followingcost(τ∗)−2(cost(τ∗)− N1+α ) =
2N
1+α − cost(τ
∗) slots, only non-
fictitious adsai, i ∈ [N ], are consecutively allocated (no slots are left empty). This means that inθα, where the ads
are disposed in a different way, we still have the guarantee that there are2N1+α−cost(τ
∗)−1 pairs of consecutive ads
(ai, aj) s.t.γi,j = 1. Thus, in the tourτβ there are, at least,2N1+α−cost(τ
∗)−1 edges of weight 1. Therefore, given
that a tour is composed ofN edges, inτβ there can be at mostN− 2N1+α+cost(τ
∗)+1 edges of weight 2. The length
of τβ is upper-boundedbycost(τβ) ≤ 2N1+α−cost(τ
∗)−1+2(N− 2N1+α+cost(τ
∗)+1) = cost(τ∗)+ 2Nα1+α+1. Now
we can state:cost(τβ) ≤ cost(τ∗)+ 2αN1+α+1 ≤ cost(τ
∗)+2αN ≤ cost(τ∗)+2αcost(τ∗) = (1+2α) cost(τ∗) <
(1 + β) cost(τ∗), where: (i) the second inequality holds forN ≥ 1+α2α2 ; (ii ) the third inequality holds since
N ≤ cost(τ∗) and (iii ) the last inequality holds since, by assumption,α < β2 . Thus, for the instances where
N ≥ 1+α2α2 if there were an algorithm that
1
1+α–approximates FNEaa(K)-r with α <
1
412 , there would be a
1
1+β
approximation ofATSP (1, 2) with β < 1206 . We obtained an absurd.
We finally show that we can deal with the non existence of the oracle returningcost(τ∗). For all the in-
stances ofATSP (1, 2) with N vertices,N ≤ cost(τ∗) ≤ 2N . So, we run the polynomial11+α–approximation
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algorithm of FNEaa(K)-r for all the valuesK = m with m ∈ {N . . . , 2N}, obtainm tours τmβ and set
τβ = argminm∈{N,...,2N} cost(τ
m





-Approximate Greedy Algorithm for FNE
aa
(c)-r, for any c
. The algorithm orders the ads in nonincreasing order ofqivi and allocates them in the odd slots, starting from the
one with the highest product; even slots are left empty.
Proposition 5. The greedy algorithm above is12 -approxi-mate for FNEaa(c)-r, for anyc.
Proof. Let θ.5 be the allocation obtained by the algorithm. We want to provethat SW (θ.5) ≥ SW (θ∗)/2.
W.l.o.g., rename the ads so thatq1v1 ≥ q2v2 ≥ . . . ≥ qNvN . Let K ′ = ⌈K/2⌉. We haveSW (θ.5) =∑
m∈[K′] Λ2m−1qmvm. On the other hand,SW (θ
∗) ≤
∑
m∈[K]Λmqmvm. SinceΛiqivi ≥ Λi+1qi+1vi+1,
we haveΛiqivi ≥ 1/2
∑











Λmqmvm ≥ SW (θ
∗)/2.
The greedy algorithm above is a MIR, rangeΘ′ being all the allocations that leave even slots empty. The solution
output is indeed the one guaranteeing maximum social welfare inΘ′. We therefore have proved the existence of a
1/2-approximate truthful polynomial-time mechanism for FNEaa(c)-r.
6 FNEaa(c) is APX-hard
We now prove that FNEaa(1)-r (Proposition 6) and FNEaa(1)-nr (Proposition 7) are APX-hard. First we state two
auxiliary lemmata. Hereinafter, for the sake of notation, we ill denote asSW1(θ) andSWK(θ) the objective
function ofB–FNEaa(1)-r andB–FNEaa(K)-r, respectively.
Lemma 1. Let θ be an allocation (possibly containing empty slots) and letθ′ be the allocation obtained fromθ
by replacing, for each pair(ai−1, ai) in θ such thatγi−1,i = 0, adai−1 with a⊥. ThenSW1(θ) = SW1(θ′).
Proof. Let (ai−1, ai) be the first pair of ads inθ with the property thatγi−1,i = 0, and letθ′′ be the allo-





j=i+1 CTRj(θ)vj denote the contributions to theSW of the ads allocated, respectively, above and below
the pair(ai−1, ai). We can writeSW1(θ) = SWA1 (θ) + SW
B
1 (θ) + CTRi−1(θ)vi−i + CTRi(θ)vi. By as-
sumption, we haveCTRi−1(θ)vi−i = 1 (asCTRi−1(θ) = 1 andai−1 6= a⊥) andCTRi(θ)vi = 0. We
note thatSWA1 (θ
′′) = SWA1 (θ) andSW
B
1 (θ
′′) = SWB1 (θ). Furthermore, we note thatCTRi−1(θ
′′)vi−i +
CTRi(θ
′′)vi = 1, asvi−i = 0 andCTRi(θ′′) = 1. So we can conclude thatSW1(θ) = SW1(θ′′). By repeatedly
applying the above procedure onθ′′ we can obtain an allocationθ′ containing no pair of ads(ai−1, ai) where
γi−1,i = 0 and such thatSW1(θ) = SW1(θ′).
Lemma 2. Let θ be an allocation such that no pair of ads(ai−1, ai) exists whereγi−1,i = 0. ThenSW1(θ) =
SWK(θ).
Proof. The claim follows from the fact that∀i ∈ N , CTRi(θ) = 1 for bothB–FNEaa(1)-r andB–FNEaa(K)-r
if θ does not contain any pair of ads(ai−1, ai) for whichγi−1,i = 0.
Proposition 6. FNEaa(1)-r is APX-hard.
Proof. We prove that the subproblemB–FNEaa(1)-r is APX–hard via an approximation preserving reduction frm
the APX-hard problemB–FNEaa(K)-r (Theorem 3). In particular, we will show that computing anapproximate
solution forB–FNEaa(1)-r is not easier thanB–FNEaa(K)-r on the same instance.
11






1 denote, respectively, the optimal
allocation forB–FNEaa(K)-r andB–FNEaa(1)-r. For the sake of contradiction, let us suppose thatSWK(θ∗K) >
SW1(θ
∗
1). We can assume without loss of generality thatθ
∗
K does not contain a pair(ai−1, ai) such thatγi−1,i = 0,
as replacingai−1 with a⊥ would yield an allocation with a non-decreasing SW value. ByLemma 2 and by




1), which contradicts the optimality ofθ
∗
1 .
We are now going to prove that given anα–approximate solutionθα1 to the objective ofB–FNEaa(1)-r we can





K). This is easily done by replacingai−1 with a⊥ for each couple of ads(ai−1, ai) in θ
α
1 such thatγi−1,i =
0, thus obtainingθ′α1 . By Lemmata 1 and 2 we finally conclude thatSW1(θ
α
1 ) = SW1(θ
′α
1 ) = SWK(θ
′α
1 ).
Proposition 7. FNEaa(1)-nr is APX-hard.
Proof. We conduct the proof by reduction from problemB–FNEaa(1)-r. In particular, we add to the instance of
B–FNEaa(1)-r K new ads{aN+1, . . . , aN+K} such that: (i) vj = 0 for all j ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N + K} and (ii )
γi,j = γj,i = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N +K} andj ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N +K}. Let θαnr be anα-approximate solution
for the so-defined FNEaa(1)-nr problem. We can assume w.l.o.g. thatθαnr does not contain anya⊥, as in the no-
reset model we can always allocate any non-allocated ad to anempty slot obtaining a non-decreasingSW value.
We observe that, from a generic allocationθnr, it is possible to obtain an allocationθr by substituting any adaj ,
j ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N +K}, in θnr with a⊥ s.t. SW r(θr) = SWnr(θnr), and vice versa. Thus, fromθαnr we can
obtain an allocationθαr s.t.SW
r(θαr ) = SW
nr(θαnr); SW
x(θ) denoting the social welfare ofθ ∈ Θ in the model
with resetx ∈ {r, nr}. Furthermore, letθ∗r andθ
∗
nr be the optimal solutions, respectively, forB–FNEaa(1)-r
and the FNEaa(1)-nr defined by our reduction. According to the observations above, it is easy to check that
SW r(θ∗r ) = SW
nr(θ∗nr) holds. In fact, let̃θnr be the solution obtained fromθ
∗
r by substituting eacha⊥ with an
adaj , j ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N + K}. ThenSW r(θ∗r ) = SW
nr(θ̃nr). Furthermore,SWnr(θ̃nr) = SWnr(θ∗nr),
as otherwise ifSWnr(θ̃nr) < SWnr(θ∗nr) we could translateθ
∗
nr into a solutionθ̃r for B–FNEaa(1)-r such
thatSW r(θ∗r ) < SW
r(θ̃r). A similar argument holds if we consider the allocationθ̃r obtained by substituting
all adsaj , j ∈ {N + 1, . . . , N + K}, in θ∗nr with a⊥. Finally, SW




7 FNE+aa(c)-nr is APX-complete for constantγmin
Theorem 4. FNE+aa(1)-nr is APX-hard.
Proof. Let {γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-nr denote the subclass of FNE
+
aa(1)-nr whereγij ∈ {γmin, 1} for all i, j ∈ N
and a given0 < γmin < 1. We prove the APX-hardness of FNE+aa(1)-nr by an approximation preserving
reduction from problemB-FNEaa(1)-nr (proved APX-hard in Proposition 7) to problem{γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-
nr: we prove the existence of anα-approximate algorithm for{γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-nr to imply the existence of a
2α-approximate algorithm forB-FNEaa(1)-nr.
The instance of{γmin, 1}-FNE+aa(1)-nr is obtained from the instance ofB-FNEaa(1)-nr by simply setting
γ′i,j = γmin =
1






B be an optimal solution for problems{γmin, 1}-FNE
+
aa(1)-nr andB-FNEaa(1)-nr, respec-
tively. We haveSW (θ∗B) ≤ SW (θ
∗
γmin
). Indeed, if there is no(ai−1, ai) ∈ θ∗B s.t. γi−1,i = 0 thenSW (θ
∗
B) =
SW (θ∗γmin), whereas if there is a pair(ai−1, ai) ∈ θ
∗
B s.t.γi−1,i = 0 thenSW (θ
∗




Let now θγmin be anα-approximation of{γmin, 1}-FNE
+
aa(1)-nr and letθB be the corresponding solution
for B-FNEaa(1)-nr. (I.e.,θB is the solutionθγmin where theγmin externalities weigh 0.) We now prove that
SW (θγmin) ≤ 2SW (θB). We haveSW (θB) = 1 + P(θB), whereP(θB) ≤ K − 1 denotes the number of pairs
(ai−1, ai) of ads inθB such thatγi−1,i = 1. Likewise,SW (θγmin) = 1+P(θγmin)+(K−1−P(θγmin)) ·γmin.
By construction,P(θB) = P(θγmin) = P , from which it follows thatSW (θγmin) ≤ 2 · SW (θB) is equivalent
to 1 + K−1−P1+P γmin ≤ 2. This is proved by noticing that1 +
K−1−P




P+1 , where last
equality follows from definition ofγmin.
7.1 Approximation algorithm
We now prove that anyα-approximate algorithm for Weighted 3-Set Packing (W3SP) can be turned into an




Given a universeU and a collection of its subsets each of cardinality at most 3 and associated to a weight,
W3SP consists of finding a sub-collection of pairwise-disjoint subsets of maximal weight. Several constant-ratio
approximate algorithms are known in literature to solve this problem, e.g., the algorithm in [4] provides a1/2-
approximation. We now present a reduction from FNE+aa(c)-nr to W3SP, similar in spirit to that defined, for
positive only externalities, in [6].
Theorem 5. Given anα–approximate algorithm for problem W3SP, we can obtain an(αγcmin)-approximation
algorithm for problem FNE+aa(c)-nr.
Proof. Given an instance of FNE+aa(c)-nr, we obtain an instance of W3SP by means of the following reduction. To
simplify the presentation, we suppose thatK is even (the proof can be easily extended for an oddK). We divideK





sets, each set having the form{ai, aj , p},
wherep ∈ {1, 3, 5, . . . ,K − 1} andi, j ∈ N . The weight of a set is defined as the maximum social welfare that
adsai andaj can provide when assigned to slotssp andsp+1 without taking into considerations the externalities
of ai andaj on the ads allocated to slotssm, m 6= p, p + 1. Specifically,W (ai, aj , p) = max{Λpqivi +
Λp+1γi,jqjvj ,Λpqjvj + Λp+1γj,iqivi}. Note that there is an immediate mapping between solutions ofW3SP




respectively, an optimal allocation for W3SP and an optimalallocation for FNE+aa(c)-nr. Furthermore, letθ
α
S be
anα-approximate solution for W3SP, andθα be the corresponding solution to FNE+aa(c)-nr. Since in W3SP, outer-
block externalities are not taken into consideration, we have: W (θ∗S) ≥ SW (θ
∗) andSW (θα) ≥ γcminW (θ
α
S).










Corollary 1. If γmin is bounded from below by a constant (i.e.,γmin ∈ Ω(1)), then FNE+aa(c)-nr is approximable
within a constant factor.
It can be easily shown that the above algorithm is not monotone.
Theorem 6. The algorithm of Theorem 5 is not monotone
Proof. Consider an instanceI of FNE+aa(1)-nr with N = K = 4 whereinΛ3γz,4 < Λ4γ3,4, for z ∈ {1, 2},
v1, v2 ≫ v3, v4 andγ1,2 = γ2,1 = 1 so thatW (a1, a2, 1) is much bigger than any otherW (ai, aj, 1). There-
fore, any reasonable approximation of the W3SP instance constructed uponI must return sets{a1, a2, 1} and
{a3, a4, 3}. Additionally considerv4 <
Λ4γ4,3
Λ23−Λ3Λ4γ3,4
so thatW (a3, a4, 3) = Λ3q3v3 + Λ4γ3,4q4v4. So the so-
lution θ returned by the algorithm run onI placesa4 in s4, resulting inCTR4(θ) = q4Λ4γ3,4. Take now the
instanceI ′ defined asI except thatv1, v2 ≫ v′4 >
Λ4γ4,3
Λ23−Λ3Λ4γ3,4
> v4. As before, the approximation algorithm for
W3SP will return sets{a1, a2, 1} and{a3, a4, 3} but this timeW ′(a3, a4, 3) = Λ3q4v4 +Λ4γ4,3q3v3. Therefore,
the solutionθ′ returned by the algorithm run onI ′ places ada4 in slot s3, i.e.,CTR4(θ′) = q4Λ3γz,4, where
z ∈ {1, 2} is the ad placed in slots2 in the allocationθ′. The algorithm is therefore not monotone and cannot be
used to design a truthful mechanism.
8 Approximating FNEaa(c)-nr
Similarly to the casec = K, Color Coding can be applied to design an optimal exponential-time algorithm
finding the optimal solution and a simple modification of suchalgorithm returns a log(N)2min{N,K} approximation in
polynomial time. While the basic idea is the same, some details change here.
We denote byS ⊆ C a subset of colors and byδ(a) a function returning the color assigned toa. Given a
coloring δ, the best colorful allocation is found by dynamic programming. For|S| > c, W (S, 〈ah0 , . . . , ahc〉)
contains the value of the best allocation with colors inS in which the lastc + 1 ads areah0 , . . . , ahc from
top to bottom. (The definition naturally extends for|S| ≤ c.) Starting fromW (∅, 〈〉) = 0, we can compute
W recursively. For instance, for|S| > c, W (S ∪ {δ(ahc)}, 〈ah0 , . . . , ahc〉) = Λ|S|+1vhcqhc
∏c−1
i=0 γhi,hi+1 +
maxa W (S, 〈a, ah0 , . . . , ahc−1〉) if δ(ahc) 6∈ S and−∞ otherwise. Given a random coloring, the probability that
the ads composing the best allocation are colorful isK!
KK
. Thus, repeating the procedurereK times, wherer ≥ 1,
the probability of finding the best allocation is1− e−r. The complexity isO((2e)KKN c+2). The algorithm can
be derandomized with an additional cost ofO(log2(N)).
By applying the above algorithm to the firstK ′ slots,K ′ = min{K, ⌈log(N)⌉}, we obtain an algorithm with
complexityO(K3.5N c+2 log22(N)). We observe that ifc is not a constant, the complexity is exponential. It is not
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too hard to note that such an algorithm islog(N)2min{N,K} -approximate. Moreover, this algorithm is MIR and as such
can be used to design a truthful mechanism.
9 Conclusions
We enrich the literature on externalities in SSAs by introducing more general ways to model slot- and ad-dependent
externalities, while giving a (nearly) complete picture ofthe computational complexity of the problem. In detail,
we enrich the naive model of SSAs by adding: (i) the concepts of limited user memory (ii ) contextual externalities
and (iii ) refreshable user memory (i.e., reset model).
This gives rise to the FNEsa model, where ad- and slot-dependent externalities are factorized as in the cascade
model and the FNEaa model, where the externalities and not factorized.
We satisfactorily solve the problem for FNEsa, whereas our results leave unanswered a number of interesting
questions, with regards to both approximation and truthfulness for FNEaa. The parameterc is central to this list.
If c is constant, then we do not know whether a constant approximation lgorithm for FNEaa(c) exists; this holds
also for the special case of FNE+aa(c)-nr whenγmin is not a constant. In the latter case, whenγmin is instead
constant we are not aware of any truthful constant approximation mechanism. Motivated by the fact that FNEaa-r
is, apparently, an easier problem than FNEaa-nr, we believe that an interesting direction for future research is to
study reset in more detail in order to understand its role w.r.t. the relatively harder FNEaa-nr.
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